New Year"s government assault on the IMF, aimed at getting an additional $ 2 billion, might seem a critical factor in overcoming the crisis. Meanwhile, the Fund"s decision could not change the economic prospects of Ukraine. Then, more recently, the dollar equivalent of its GDP was about 140-180 billion dollars (2007-2008).. It would be naive to associate it with its own dynamics is not trafficking, as a tranche of the International Monetary Fund, not exceeding fifteen per cent of this amount.

decline in industrial production in Ukraine began in November 2008, chronologically, coincided with the beginning of economic recession in the U.S. and the EU. But he grew synchronously with the fall in world commodity prices - in addition to oil and gas on international markets rapidly became cheaper, for example, and metals. Thus, the global index of steel prices fell in the second half of 2008 almost doubled. The most vulnerable in these conditions were commodity economy. Another annoyance for them was the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers - one of the leaders of the market for credit default swaps. Since his fall sharply increased the risk of lending to emerging markets, while reducing the possibility of their external borrowing.

Only these two events have provoked a sharp decrease in foreign exchange earnings in Ukraine: in the fourth quarter of 2008, its export earnings have fallen relative performance of the third quarter, more than a third, and the volume of external loan proceeds - tripled. In the domestic market was formed and began to grow rapidly shortage of foreign currency. Its coverage was accompanied by a 60 percent devaluation of the hryvnia currency and the active intervention of the National Bank, the volume of which for the last three months of 2008 exceeded $ 10 billion

Along with Ukraine increased sensitivity to the fall in commodity prices also showed the country with low diversification of production. Significantly, the maximum depth of the recession in Norway (2.5%, 2009), relating to the world"s leading suppliers of petroleum and natural gas was much lower than in Russia (10,9%) or, for example, Mexico (10.1% ), also specialized in their exports.

no less remarkable and the national default of Iceland, whose financial stability has become a hostage ultimately unsustainable debt and single-industry reference to the fisheries. In this case the basis of the debt crisis lay not the usual "eating away" of foreign loans, and flaws related investments. In particular, it became clear that financial participa1000tion in the housing rush is no less dangerous than massive support for imported consumer goods: in both cases, the boom of personal consumption, not production of income to service debt obligations.
In this regard, it is not surprising that the epicenter of the economic turmoil in the United States. Besides the fact that the U.S. economy shows stable low rates of accumulation (about 16-17% of GDP against the world average of 20-22%), it is still bogged down in speculation in real estate, sharply narrowing the possible return of mortgage loans. Sustained immunity is China, by contrast, is easy to explain an incredibly high propensity to invest (from 30-35% of GDP in the 90 years up to 45-50% in the current decade) and an extremely small fraction of personal consumption. In this diversified investment in technology and production of means of production makes it virtually immune to the current crisis: After the slowdown of China"s GDP up 6.1% in the middle of 2009, already six months later they again rose to 9%.

In Ukraine, the beginning of global recession is observed in almost the whole possible range of its premises. A considerable part of them was shown so clearly that involuntarily raises the question of the nature of the efforts of the Ukrainian state, as well as an economic model structured around them since independence.

particular interest is de-industrialization of the domestic economy. Whilst the whole world is fighting for the right production and marketing of an increasingly technology-related products to additional income, Ukraine almost two decades, is moving in the opposite direction. During 1990-2008, the proportion of machinery in its structure of industrial production fell by half - from 31 to 14%, and Steel, by contrast, grew up and almost in the same proportion - from 11 to almost 27%. In this case an apparent attenuation of innovation. Thus, the associated development of industrial production declined in 2003-2008 tripled.

Links shortcomings of Soviet technology and the complexity of their development after the collapse of the Union were certainly appropriate for some time. But they can not explain why over the years of Ukrainian independence, Malaysia and China have strengthened their position in the international market of microelectronics, and its domestic production, and supplies when a unique military complex, is reduced to pischalok for toys. At the same complaints about the miserable legacy of the automobile industry one iota does not explain why its level is increased by assembling Korean, Chinese and Indian cars, while Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania and the Czech Republic have a stake in the development of American, French, German and Japanese industries, then exporting its products to Ukraine. A Chinese entrepreneurs with agree with Ford to buy Volvo.

independent Ukraine, it seems, has not realized that its legacy aircraft industry - technological luxury, the right of possession which belongs to only a few countries. And if contrary to national policy, it has not been lost, it was only thanks mortgaged once the reserve of strength, which is not limitless. Moreover, the domestic aviation industry has long lost the signs of mass production, huddled up to build a few planes a year.

While the leading countries see their future with nanotechnology, in Ukraine, it again depends on the coal and iron beds Donbass and Kryvorizhzhya. Given that a hundred years ago, their power reflects the new horizons of the domestic economy, and today - its "post-industrial" past. On the eve of the crisis the share of commodities in the structure of the domestic industry was 70% against 14,6% of investment goods. Similar relationships are observed in the structure of merchandise exports. If in the 80 years it dominated by engineering products - approximately 37% and the share of ferrous metallurgy was two times less (18%), in the 2005-2008 ye1000ar have been observed directly opposite proportions: Engineering - 15%, ferrous metallurgy - 40%.
In the early 90"s, few talked about the risk of commodity redevelopment of Ukraine. Today it is no longer a risk and not a threat but a fait accompli, not causing any discussions. The domestic economy seems to be fully adapted to the new status of raw materials periphery. At the same time its dynamics rather rigidly adhered to the movement of world prices for steel, chemicals, grain and sunflower. In this regard, the debate about the economic achievements of today"s political opponents rather conventional. Just one more fortunate, and others - less.

Thus, during the first prime minister"s tenure Yanukovych observed 73-percent increase in world prices for steel. Not surprisingly, this period of sustained growth of domestic remembered GDP: 9,6% in 2003 and 12,1% - in 2004. But Yulia Tymoshenko in 2005, frankly no luck. During the first five months of its term at the head of the Government of steel in the international market prices dropped by 21%. The result is slower growth of the Ukrainian economy slowed to 1.9% (nine months of 2005).

In 2006 and 2007 there was a new rise in world prices for steel, respectively, 14 and 22%. Simultaneously with increased growth and Ukrainian GDP - up to 7,3 and 7,9%, coinciding with the second term of office of prime minister Viktor Yanukovych. This added impetus of economic dynamics gave active foreign borrowing, have stimulated housing and office construction, imported cars and spare parts, the massive consumer imports and related trade. Silent background of this growth is-increasing external debt, the gross volume of which the second "regional" government has grown in 1,7 times - from 46,2 to 80 billion dollars

taking over from his joint initiative of the Orange team for the first time tasted the fruits of a favorable commodity market conditions in December 2007. In fact, until the fall of 2008, the Government of Yulia Tymoshenko did not experience serious financial constraints: an unprecedented increase in steel prices (61% in January-June), and external borrowings of the private sector to promote decent dynamics of GDP and budget revenues. In this quarterly GDP growth consistently over 6%, and the budget was actively supported by taxes and charges on imports swell. But, with the rapid decrease in loans and commodity prices situation has changed dramatically. In the fourth quarter GDP fell by 8% in the first quarter of 2009 - by 19,3%.

current government, forced to answer not only for their decisions, but also for the policies of the past two decades, certainly not to be envied. However, his frank populism suggests that it is - not the worst student of his predecessors. In 2004, "the Regionals" initiated budget flirting with voters, then in 2005, their political opponents have intensified the budget fight for the loyalty of the population. In all the known dependence of "investment - economic growth - wages - pensions, attention was focused only in the latter two components. By Investment same interest only insofar as they may be involved in permanent campaigns.

For nine months, instead of the first premiership Yulia Tymoshenko, the pace of investment in fixed assets decreased to 3,4% against 34,5% a year earlier. Then, similar dynamics can be explained somehow retrenchment due to falling market conditions for raw materials. However, in January-September 2008, when world prices for metals and wheat rolls over, the situation repeated itself: investment in fixed capital again fell to 4,7% against 28,5% in 2007.

These results are not surprising if we recall that in March of 2005 the first "orange" government strongly manipulated the budget to increase social payments, and in 2007, the future prime minister has promised to resign if1000you do not return for two years, the contributions of the former Sberbank. For objectivity"s sake it is worth noting that the then pre-election promises of the Party of Regions have been no less generous. According to expert estimates, their implementation would cost 30% of planned budget, while the BYuT social package was pulling 25%.

These layout notable not only because of their protagonists and actors - the most experienced Ukrainian politicians had time for quite twenty years to show yourself at all senior executive and elected officials of the State, including president. Significantly, that they are sympathetic stable - in different configurations - no less than two-thirds of Ukrainian voters. What may be an indication not only of the prevailing support of economic policy. But it is also about his destructive indulgence most primitive society"s expectations.

In this regard, it must be recognized that output growth in the independent Ukraine has never belonged to one of the key tasks. Quite the contrary - in 2001 parliament dismissed Yushchenko government after when it was over a decade of decline and the economy started to grow. Unfortunately, the last five years only confirmed this rule: start with a 12-percent growth, she completed a 15-percent decline. It can hardly blame the adverse conditions. In 2005-2008 Ukraine paid for gas imports 24.7 billion
dollars, and for imported vehicles and spare parts - 27,1 billion These funds will allow the construction of several auto plants, "not in word but in deed," helping to create five million new jobs. However, the Ukrainian state has chosen to ignore such opportunities.

Like the fact that in these years, translation of our former compatriots and zarobitchan "two times higher than the currency earnings from exports of grain - the deadly statistics for a country aspiring to reform the village and the status of European barns. Of course, we can rejoice for the people who managed at least in foreign countries to increase their wealth. But it is unlikely for the state is unable to offer its citizens a better use of talent and zeal than immigration. The latter, incidentally, is a sure sign of serious market defects, since the cost of local production does not play embodies in her work, pushing out of the country"s most experienced and entrepreneurial professionals.

selection and promotion of the market the worst of all possible variants is known in economic literature as "negative selection". By the phenomenon commonly use when describing the local market failures. Domestic phenomenon seems to be related to the failed global. After twenty years of market reforms in China, the world started talking about a new economic miracle, recognizing the progress the country has been increasing its GDP by ten percent. In Ukraine, after seventeen years of experimentation of GDP remained at 25% less than in 1990. As a result of the eighteenth they are likely to prove less than the 35-37 per cent. It links to the negative impact of the global crisis unconvincing, since it is unclear why they do not interfere with the growth of the same China.

Start the recent economic history of Ukraine coincided with the collapse of the Union and accordingly triumph of neoliberal ideas. Meanwhile, domestic familiarity with them was even less profound than the reading of Marx"s theory of the Bolsheviks. As a result of sufficient prerequisites for social welfare has been declared private property and free markets, but necessary - universal free privatization and the lack of state control over prices. Today"s realities - then harvest crops. The country has double flowers bloom hundreds of monopolies and tens of thousands monopolek not accountable to the State is unable to verify any price, nor the quality of their products, even if it is a notoriously dangerous to life and heal1000th products. Because of this quantitative decline very often accompanied by degradation of quality, for which the strip of former guests are prohibitive.
However, all the "reform" the problem of the past decade has long been fulfilled. In this case, however, the victim of massive wealth redistribution fell as state property, and morality, rules which the second time in a century have been turned on its head. Along the way, was distorted and the economic orientation of society: the legalization of capturing people"s property development of the production has lost all meaning, since its yield did not go to any comparison with the possibility of instant enrichment through the legal expropriation of "orphan" companies. Not surprisingly, among them increased vitality showed the least complex and capital intensive. What is quite consistent with the investment potential and business horizons first native neophytes capitalism.

Their management is usually short enough for rapid personal enrichment with associated financial and material depletion of the once strong industrial complexes. By the beginning of this decade the leaders of the domestic industry and business began to smelters. Much the same part of the engineering works on the verge of physical extinction retard the rental and sale of vacant land adjacent areas. This former engineer and "blue collar" mass dissolved in the ranks of the bazaar, which replaced the scientific and production associations and become the embodiment of national "market."

For 18 years since 1990, the annual volume of investment in fixed capital in Ukraine dropped by half: the beginning of last year they accounted for only 44.7% of the level of the 90th. At the same time, real consumer spending grew in 1,4 times. These disparities better than any words explain the reasons for the sustainable reproduction of many domestic problems: degradation of technological enterprises, lack of commercial supply, its excessive costs on, high inflation, shortage of jobs, etc. Prevailing ideas about the possibility of overcoming them through the flexible exchange rate and price stability are not more productive than the neoliberal illusion 90.

In all fairness, criticism of the planned economy can not be denied that for a half or two dozen years, including during the civil war and devastation, it has allowed to build Dneproges and Kryvorizhstal. It is difficult to say that it can oppose today"s economic model. Тем более что массовая распродажа госсобственности не имеет ничего общего с формированием фундамента будущих поколений, а служит хаотичному затыканию бюджетных дыр. Как это произошло, например, с приватизацией той же "Криворожстали" и последующим растворением вырученных от ее продажи 4,2 млрд. долл.

Инвестиционная активность отечественного бизнеса, к сожалению, немногим выше, чем у государства. Текущий кризис - наглядное тому подтверждение, поскольку падение конкурентоспособности при ухудшающейся конъюнктуре является прямым следствием аморфной инвестиционной политики. Ее результативность наглядно демонстрирует горно-металлургический комплекс, не использовавший благоприятные возможности последних десяти лет.

Еще в 1999-2002 годах ряд его предприятий участвовал в экономическом эксперименте, получив возможность снизить на 70% ставку налога на прибыль; списать накопленную задолженность по неуплаченным налогам, сборам, пеням и штрафам; вдвое уменьшить пени и штрафы за будущую несвоевременную уплату налогов; наполовину снизить ставки сбора в Государственный инновационный фонд; не платить сборы на строительство, ремонт и поддержание автодорог общего использования и т.д. В это же время их экспортная деятельность была поддержана резкой девальвацией гривни, сопровождавшей валютно-финансовый кризис 1998-1999 годов. Наконец, уже в процессе указанного эксперимента на междун1000ародных рынках начался рост цен на металлы, продолжавшийся с небольшими перерывами до середины 2008 года. При этом глобальный индекс цен на сталь вырос в четыре раза.

Вопреки уникальным возможностям, ни о какой массовой модернизации отечественной металлургии речь не шла. На какие цели были потрачены 75 млрд. долл. валютной выручки, полученной металлургическими предприятиями только в 2005-2008 годах, - загадка, ответ на которую знают лишь их собственники. Между тем к началу падения мировой конъюнктуры они оказались готовы не лучше, чем украинские строители к сокращению внешнего кредитования. Что, по сути дела, и явилось одной из главных причин начала в стране экономического кризиса. Это, однако, нимало не смутило владельцев отечественных метзаводов, уже осенью 2008 года заявивших о необходимости их срочной поддержки государством.

Углубление сырьевой специализации не только привязывает украинскую экономику к хозяйственному циклу ее индустриальных партнеров, но также увеличивает амплитуду ее конъюнктурных колебаний. При этом технологическое увядание снижает производственный потенциал и будущие возможности страны. Надежды на иностранных инвесторов необоснованны, поскольку они выстраивают свою политику, учитывая местные приоритеты. Так, к началу прошлого года в структуре прямых иностранных инвестиций, привлеченных за годы независимости, вложения в операции с недвижимостью в восемь раз превышали объем инвестиций в машиностроение. Что служит неплохим индикатором масштаба хозяйственных задач, решаемых Украиной.

Сергей Кораблин

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